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Introduction 
The onward movement of displaced people has attracted considerable 
research and policy attention in recent years. Faced with difficult 
conditions in countries of first asylum, displaced people sometimes move 
onward to more distant countries through refugee resettlement 
programmes or family reunion provisions. People also move onwards from 
countries of first asylum through independently-made arrangements - 
often using irregular methods to reach their destination to overcome 
attempts by policy-makers to contain refugees in their region of origin. 
There is considerable policy interest in these types of ‘secondary 
movement’, both on the part of richer states concerned to limit asylum 
claims, and organisations like UNHCR, concerned to ensure that countries 
of first asylum offer adequate protection to refugees (UNHCR 2006). 
This paper focuses on a third type of onward movement, hitherto 
largely overlooked: the onward movement of new citizens of refugee 
background within the European Union. In 1995–2004, 3.2 million people 
claimed asylum in the EU and around 1.3 million were granted refugee or 
some other form of humanitarian or temporary protection.i Nearly half a 
million were recognised as Convention status refugees (UNHCR 2006: 
226). Many Convention refugees, and also some people who were given 
other forms of protection, subsequently gained citizenship of their host 
state. These new citizens have the right to move freely within the EU. 
Preliminary research suggests that among certain groups of new citizens 
there may be a significant emerging trend towards relocation within the 
EU. This movement of new citizens is entirely legal - indeed, the mobility 
of workers within the EU is generally promoted. Yet it forms a new strand 
in EU mobility that is as yet poorly understood. It represents an aspect of 
refugee (re)settlement in the EU that raises questions about refugee and 
immigrant integration in national and supranational contexts. These 
relocations also have implications for transnational relations and diaspora 
‘re-grouping’. 
This paper reviews and discusses the still limited evidence relating 
to these movements, and explores the issues that they raise. The paper 
first reviews the evidence on the patterns and geography of EU mobility. 
Second, it outlines the legal and policy framework. Third, building on 
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recent research with Somalis and Sri Lankan Tamils in the UK, we explore 
some preliminary insights into the motivations and experiences of the 
people involved. Fourth, we explore the conceptual and practical issues 
raised by this mobility and outline an agenda for future research. 
 
 
The geography of new citizens’ onward migration: initial 
evidence 
According to the European Commission, less than 2 per cent of EU citizens 
live in another member state, and less than 20 per cent of foreign-born 
workers in the EU15 countries are citizens of another EU country (EC 
2006). The countries with the highest proportions of labour force from 
another EU state are Ireland (5.3 per cent), Belgium (4.6 per cent), 
Austria (3.3 per cent), Germany (2.5 per cent), and the UK (2.2 per cent). 
Among recently mobileii EU-15 citizens of working age, the top 
destinations are the UK (27 per cent), Germany (20 per cent), Spain (14 
per cent), and France (11 per cent). Only around 3 per cent of EU citizens 
expect to move to another EU Member State in the next five years, with 
the highest mobility potentials in Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Finland and 
France.  
The movement of new citizens of refugee background is a small part of 
this EU mobility. So far, the main sources of information on this mobility 
consist of qualitative research with specific national groups; administrative 
data from local authorities, schools and local services; and local media 
and community workers. These sources point to several patterns, 
although information on the scale of these movements is as yet limited. It 
is clear that significant numbers of Somali Europeans have relocated, 
mainly Danish, Dutch, Finnish, Italian and Norwegian citizens of Somali 
origin relocating to the UK, since the end of the 1990s.iii It is also clear 
that many Sri Lankan Tamil Europeans have relocated within the EEA from 
about the same time: mainly Dutch, French, German, and Scandinavian 
citizens of Sri Lankan Tamil origin relocating to the UK.iv Beyond this there 
is some evidence to suggest some relocation among Sudanese Europeans, 
mainly Dutch, Finnish, German and Norwegian citizens of Sudanese origin 
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moving to other countries, particularly the UK.v There is also anecdotal 
evidence of Dutch nationals of Iraqi origin moving to the UK.vi Some 
relocation has also been noted among Afghan, Congolese and Ivorian 
Europeans, moving mainly from France and Germany to the UK.vii There 
may be other patterns not yet identified – the UK may not be the only 
destination country. 
More research is needed to mine existing macro-level data sources that 
may shed light on the scale of the onward movement of these new 
citizens, including administrative data (e.g. border clearance data, and 
municipality records), passenger surveys, census data, and labour force 
and other national-level surveys. A key challenge with such sources is that 
there is often relatively limited disaggregated information on the 
migration of EU nationals. Moreover, some sources only record country of 
birth, and others only nationality: for example, the UK census collects 
information on country of birth but not nationality. It can be difficult to 
obtain information from standard sources on say, Iraqi-born Dutch 
nationals living in the UK.  
 
 
Legal and policy frameworks 
Freedom of movement is a long-standing aspect and an important symbol 
of European integration. The rationale is that it: 
 
…will contribute to the formation of a stronger European identity 
and a deeper European integration… From an economic perspective, 
the free movement of labour is seen as a way of promoting labour 
market efficiency by improving the matching of the available labour 
supply to the demand from employers…Greater labour force 
mobility, both between jobs (job mobility) and within and between 
countries (geographic mobility) can help the European economy 
and labour force to adapt to changing conditions more smoothly 
and efficiently, as well as respond to change in the competitive 
global economy… (EC 2006: 207). 
 
However, despite the removal of barriers to movement within the EU and 
the fact that mobility is widely regarded as a positive, 
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…actual mobility levels within Europe have remained comparatively 
low… with less than 2% of all EU citizens living in another EU 
Member State. This low overall mobility tends to indicate the 
absence of a genuine “mobility culture” for workers in the EU. (EC 
2006: 207, see also Geddes 2006). 
 
In this context, it is interesting that particular groups of new citizens may 
be manifesting a propensity for EU mobility possibly greater than those of 
the general EU population.  
What exactly are the legal provisions underpinning EU mobility? 
Under the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, citizens of member statesviii can 
freely enter and reside in other member states. They may take up 
employment and should not be discriminated against by employers 
because of their nationality in terms of conditions of employment, pay or 
working conditions (EC 2006; Guild 2004).ix Thus, new citizens of refugee 
background have the freedom to move, reside and work in any part of the 
EU. No other region in the world has allowed such a high level of mobility 
(Van Selm 2000). 
In recent years, various policy initiatives have aimed to promote 
mobility within the EU. Key initiatives include: the Action Plan on Skills 
and Mobility 2002; the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Employment 
(2005-2008); the Action Programme in the field of Lifelong Learning 
(2007-2013); and the European Year of Workers’ Mobility 2006. Efforts to 
facilitate mobility include attempts to improve the transferability and 
recognition of qualifications, the introduction of a European health 
insurance card, and better co-ordination of social security schemes (EC 
2006). 
A key concern is the issue of whether EU citizens who have 
exercised their right to move and reside have a right to access social 
benefits. There are three main principles in community social security 
legislation: first, nationals of other Member States may not be 
discriminated against in comparison with the host state’s own nationals; 
second, individuals may only be affiliated to one social security system at 
a time; and third, individuals may export their benefits to other Member 
States (Guild 2004). The goal has been not to harmonise the diverse 
welfare state models in the EU, but rather to co-ordinate across welfare 
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states to ensure the portability of entitlements for citizens moving from 
one member state to another (Geddes 2006). There is much discussion on 
EU citizens’ access to social security benefits and the jurisprudence from 
the European Court of Justice is not wholly clear. 
In the UK, for example, in order to access certain important means-
tested benefits (including Council Tax Benefit, Housing Benefit, Income 
Support and income-based Jobseeker's Allowance), EU citizens must 
prove that they are habitually resident in the UK.x In making decisions 
about who is habitually resident, decision-makers consider, amongst other 
factors, whether the person has worked in the UK, why the person came 
to the country, how they have been supporting themselves, and how long 
they intend to remain in the UK. However there is on-going discussion 
about whether these arrangements are consistent with principles of non-
discrimination and equality in European Law (EC 2005; Marsh 2002; 
Dysch 2006). 
There are also provisions for EU citizens to access education and 
health services.xi For example, in the UK schools and Local Education 
Authorities are obliged to offer school places to all children of statutory 
school age - regardless of their rights of residence. According to the 
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA), the largest group of EU 
nationals entering British schools are Portuguese, many of whose parents 
work in hotel, catering and food-processing industries, often on a seasonal 
basis meaning that the families may move many times. But the QCA also 
highlights ‘significant numbers’ of children whose families immigrated to 
and gained citizenship or residency in other EU states before settling in 
the UK, including Somalis from the Netherlands and Sweden, Sri Lankan 
Tamils in various EEA countries, and Nigerians and Ghanaians from 
Germany.xii A recent study of asylum-seekers in British schools, noted that 
a number of schools have admitted newly arrived pupils whose families 
had been granted refugee status elsewhere in the EU. ‘In an extreme 
case, one primary school had admitted in a two-year period 300 such 
pupils. The school managed with difficulty to integrate the pupils 
successfully, but not without drawing significantly upon its budget reserve’ 
(OFSTED 2003: 10). 
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In contexts where there is significant inward movement of EU 
nationals, a lack of accurate numbers can make it harder for local 
authorities to predict and plan for the resulting changes in the labour and 
housing markets and demand for education and other public services. This 
has been demonstrated with the movement to the UK of both Accession 
state nationals and nationals of various EU countries of Somali 
backgrounds (Aston 2002; Audit Commission 2007; Marsh 2002; Dysch 
2006; White 2004).  
Having indicated the limited evidence on the movement of new 
citizens of refugee background within the EU, and outlined the policy and 
legal framework that governs their movement, we now turn to two cases 
of such movement - Somalis and Sri Lankan Tamils.  
 
 
The onward movement of Somali Europeans to the UK: 
preliminary insights 
With the outbreak of civil war in north-west Somalia in the late 1980s, 
there was large-scale internal and regional displacement, with some 
people travelling further afield to Europe. Many northern Somali refugees 
joined relatives resident in the UK who had settled there earlier as a result 
of colonial ties: as students, Merchant Navy seamen or their dependents. 
As the civil war spread and the state collapsed in 1991, there was further 
mass displacement to neighbouring countries, with a sub-set of refugees 
reaching various European countries to claim asylum. There was also 
some relocation of people who worked in the Gulf states to Europe, when 
their work permits or other status expired but they were unable to return 
to Somalia. Small numbers also arrived through resettlement 
programmes. The situation in the Somali regions remains uncertain, with 
the southern Somali regions still very unstable. Displacement and 
emigration continues. 
Since the late 1990s, a further migration pattern has emerged: the 
movement of citizens of Somali origin from mainland Europe - particularly 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden - to the UK. 
Some of the newcomers lived ten or more years in mainland Europe 
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before moving to the UK. Appendix 1 summarises the patchy information 
available on the numbers of people involved. It would seem that over 
20,000 EU citizens born in Somalia or whose parents were born in Somalia 
have relocated to the UK since the late 1990s. Some EU citizens went to 
live in places where there was already an established communities; 
Bristol, the East End of London, Liverpool and Sheffield. But EU citizens 
often also settled in ‘new’ locations, particularly in the Midlands 
(Momatrade 2004). It is possible to detect particular geographic trends: 
for example, some say that people from the Netherlands tend to move to 
Leicester, while people from Scandinavia tended to move to Birmingham. 
This movement and the reasons behind it are a popular subject of 
discussion among Somali Europeans. Preliminary insights gained during a 
research project in 2004-2006 focusing on Somali displacement and 
remittance dynamics (Lindley 2006; 2007) suggests that the push and 
pull factors for this onward movement fall into three broad categories: 
economic opportunities, education and social environment. 
First, people often reported that in mainland Europe employment 
opportunities were more limited, with high unemployment rates among 
people born in Somalia in Netherlands and Scandinavia – although rates 
are also high in the UK (Bang Nielson 2004; GLA 2005). People suggested 
that in their country of citizenship even jobs not seen as highly skilled 
require good language skills and qualifications. A popular example given 
was Somali European men working as London bus drivers: 
 
In the Netherlands, bus driver is more professional than here. Bus 
drivers… have to speak Dutch perfectly, he should know the area 
he’s working [in], he should know health and safety. Very 
qualified… Here, if I pass the driving licence today, after six months 
I can drive a bus easily… I met last week one Somali and he can’t 
speak even English and he’s a bus driver. How is he communicating 
with the people?! And he told me he is working seven days and 
£2,300 a month at least he gets. And he moved from the 
Netherlands… he said, ‘I wasted my time with the Netherlands… I 
was in the Netherlands 15 years, I never worked…’ He can save 
£1,000 a month, that’s £12,000 a year. That’s a lot of money in 
Somalia! Maybe two houses! 
 
Revealingly, the wish to improve one’s economic situation was often 
linked, as in this quotation, not only to aspirations for oneself and one’s 
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household, but also to transnational aspirations: supporting relatives and 
maintaining links in Somalia. Another well-worn path for newcomers 
unable to find jobs is business, but many Somali people in the 
Netherlands, for example, found that this was difficult, requiring 
qualifications and daunting official paperwork, and some had attempted 
and failed. They were impressed with the comparative ease of opening a 
business or finding a job in the UK (see also Hansen 2006). Reportedly 
there has been a rapid growth in Somali businesses in Leicester with 36 
established in the two years to 2004 (White 2004) 
Education was the second area where there were push and pull 
factors encouraging migration from mainland Europe to the UK. The 
earlier division of students into vocational and academic education in 
some countries was seen to disadvantage students of Somali origin: 
parents feared that their children’s disrupted education and language 
skills would hold them back, that teachers underestimate these students’ 
abilities and presume that they will not go on to university. Higher 
education often appeared more open in the UK, for children but also for 
their parents as mature students (although the fees were generally 
higher). Turning to language, the use of English as a common means of 
international communication represented an incentive, and previous 
knowledge of English in some cases was a facilitating factor. 
Third, there is the social environment. There is an element of family 
and social regrouping: the presence of relatives and friends in the UK – 
some of whom sought asylum there, others of whom made the move from 
mainland Europe earlier on – represented a strong incentive. This meant 
that women might share childcare responsibilities more easily. The larger 
Somali community in the UK also appears to act as a pull. For example, 
people who claimed asylum in the Netherlands during most of the 1990s 
were dispersed to rural areas, living in close-knit white communities, 
where they felt in danger of losing their culture and control of their 
children (see also Brons and Schaap 2002).xiii In contrast, people seemed 
to feel that it would be possible to live alongside other people of Somali 
origin and retain their cultural identity by making Leicester and other UK 
cities their home, in some ways seeking out an enclave to retain their 
identity (see also Bang Nielsen 2004). People often emphasised hostile 
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political attitudes, adverse public opinion, and negative media coverage 
regarding immigrants and Muslims in their country of citizenship, citing 
particular controversies relating to anti-immigration politics and anti-
Islamic news coverage in the Netherlands, debates in Denmark on the 
circumcision of Somali girls, and the controversy over the wearing of veils 
in French schools. People commented on the greater availability of Koranic 
schools, Mosques, and the legality of qat (a leaf chewed in the Horn of 
Africa that is illegal in some Scandinavian countries) in the UK. In sum, 
although racism and discrimination persists in the UK, Somali Europeans 
seemed to feel that the relative diversity of UK cities made it easier to get 
on with life. 
The economic, educational and environmental factors that propel 
this secondary migration go far beyond the supposed primordial nomadic 
restlessness of Somali people often invoked in casual commentaries.xiv 
Moreover, these preliminary insights tend to refute the notion that people 
move in order to gain better security state benefits, as is sometimes 
suggested.xv On the contrary, state benefits in the UK may not be 
immediately accessible and tend to be less than in the Netherlands or 
Scandinavia. Many Somali EU citizens deliberately trade in more generous 
social provision elsewhere in northern Europe for what they see as better 
economic opportunities in the UK - they see their move to the UK as a 
move into economic activity rather than out of it. Some suggest that 
Somali Europeans moved to the Midlands because accommodation was 
much cheaper there. Many people do detailed research, sending a family 
member to visit and find a job and housing, and consulting among 
contacts about rent, job or business opportunities and schools. 
It is important to emphasise that these motivations emerged mainly 
from discussions with people who did move. Those who do not move are 
likely to have more positive views of the situation in their country of 
citizenship. It is also important to point out that these are perceptions 
that prompt this recent and on-going migration rather than actual 
experiences of settlement in the UK, which can hold surprises. In some 
cases, expectations were not borne out, or unanticipated disadvantages 
emerged. Some people report that they have not got to know many white 
British people as they live in areas with a large proportion of ethnic 
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minorities, and feel limited to the Somali community in terms of social 
contact. Others comment on the high cost of renting property, lower 
quality of social services (particularly health services), lack of public 
childcare provision, perceived higher crime rates in the UK, and the more 
run-down and dirty public spaces in the city where they live (see also 
Moret and Van Eck 2005; Bang Nielson 2004). Experiences of British 
secondary schools sometimes also disappoint: the disruption of changing 
school system takes a toll, and in the inner city areas where Somali 
Europeans often settle their children attend schools where there are a lot 
of problems stemming from general social disadvantage (see also Al-
Sharmani 2006). Some young people born or brought up in the 
Netherlands miss friends, do not feel at home in the UK and want to 
return to the Netherlands (Van den Reek and Hussain 2003). 
It seems that the UK is the most popular destination among Somali 
Europeans. For Diesow (2004), this is because it represents at once a 
gishiin, or transiting port (a place to stop until it is safe to return home), a 
dhul fursad leh, or land of opportunities (in terms of employment, 
business and education) and a kulmiye, or meeting point (for scattered 
family members and friends who initially sought asylum wherever possible 
and are now able to meet up again). However, it should be noted that 
beyond onward movement from other EU countries to the UK, movement 
has also been noted on a smaller scale between Germany and the 
Netherlands as part of family regrouping (Moret et al. 2005) and there are 
also aspirations among some Somali Europeans to move to North 
America. Some Somali people in Switzerland moved on to EU states and 
North America (Moret et al. 2005). 
 
 
The onward movement of Sri Lankan Tamil Europeans to the 
UK: preliminary insights 
Like Somalia, Sri Lanka has suffered protracted civil war and large scale 
displacement within and outside the country. The conflict since the early 
1980s in Sri Lanka has generated substantial movements of asylum 
seekers to Europe and other destinations, notably Canada. The UK 
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accommodates the largest and longest settled Tamil population in Europe, 
while France, Germany, Switzerland and Scandinavian countries have also 
been important destinations (Van Hear 2004). By 2002, it was estimated 
that 110,000 Sri Lankans lived in the UK, including 60,000 refugees 
(Zunzer 2004). Estimates by community leaders suggest a higher figure of 
150,000 of Sri Lankan Tamil origin in the UK, a figure which probably 
includes those born in the UK of Tamil parents. 
The Tamils in the UK have arrived in a number of different waves 
(Daniel and Thangaraj 1995; Van Hear 2004).  Professionals arrived from 
around independence in the late 1940s. Finding their paths to higher 
education blocked by discrimination, increasing numbers of Tamil students 
made their way to the UK to pursue their studies from the 1960s. From 
the later 1980s, increasing numbers of asylum seekers fleeing the 
escalating conflict sought safety in the UK, their numbers increasing 
substantially in the 1990s.  Family reunion migration was associated with 
each of these waves of primary migration. Tamil migration to countries of 
continental Europe tended to gather momentum later, partly precipitated 
by increasing restrictions introduced in the mid 1980s by the British 
government explicitly to curtail Tamil asylum migration to Britain (Pirouet 
2001). While there was some professional and student migration, most 
Tamil migration to continental Europe was of asylum seekers from the 
later 1980s and particularly in the 1990s.  
As with the Somali case, since around 2000 a substantial 
movement of Tamils to the UK has begun from continental Europe, as 
Tamils who arrived as asylum seekers in the late 1980s and 1990s finally 
became recognised as refugees and eventually acquired citizenship of EU 
member states, enabling them to move within the EU. Many have lived 
and formed families in continental European states for a decade or more, 
while waiting for their cases to work through. Asylum applications by 
Tamils in the UK have dwindled since the 2002 cease-fire in Sri Lanka and 
the wider curtailment and deterrence measures directed at asylum 
seekers by UK government, so that this regrouping – together with other 
kinds of family reunion – appears set to be the main way by which the 
Tamil population in the UK will receive newcomers.  
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Less is known about Tamil movement within the EU than is known 
about the re-grouping of Somalis. Indeed, there has been little research 
on the Sri Lanka Tamil population in the UK as a whole since the first part 
of the 1990s (Daniel and Thangaraj 1995; Siddhisena and White 1999). 
Nevertheless, preliminary work by Van Hear in 2004-2006 suggests that a 
substantial movement of Tamils from continental Europe to the UK is 
under way. The scale of this onward migration is unclear since new 
arrivals will be recorded as EU nationals rather than as Tamils, but 
anecdotally, according to Tamil community leaders and some local 
government workers, it is significant. As might be expected, the new 
arrivals appear to have settled in areas near to the core areas of Tamil 
settlement in London such as Tooting, East Ham and Wembley. However 
there is anecdotal evidence that some are also settling in other parts of 
London (such as Lewisham), other parts of the southeast (such as Milton 
Keynes) and the Midlands (such as Birmingham). 
As with the Somali European newcomers, European Tamils’ 
motivations for moving to the UK cluster around economic opportunities, 
education and language, and the social and cultural environment.  
Commonly all of these motivations are found in an individual’s or family’s 
decision to move to the UK.   
First, regarding economic opportunities, Tamils interviewed in 
London who had come from continental Europe said they found it easier to 
find employment or to set up businesses in the UK than in continental 
Europe.  A particular issue was the greater ease of entering the labour 
market – both in terms of greater opportunities and fewer obstacles.  A 
national insurance number was relatively easy to obtain, and this is the 
only form of documentation needed to start working in the low end of the 
labour market. There also appeared to be more jobs available at this end 
of the market than in the previous country of residence. The qualifications 
threshold for entering semi-skilled work also appeared to be lower in the 
UK than in some other European states. As for the more highly skilled, 
professional qualifications could be converted more easily in the UK than 
in some other EU states, because initial qualifications gained in the Sri 
Lankan educational system were based on the British model. In other 
words, the much vaunted flexibility of the UK labour market, at the lower 
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end at least, seemed to be attractive to Tamils who had experienced more 
constrained employment conditions in continental Europe. 
  The experiences of some families recently settled in the UK from 
France, the Netherlands and Germany bear out these observations. A 
Tamil man who had relocated with his family to the UK from France in 
2003 observed wryly that ‘if you are in Europe, you have to get a diploma 
in their language to get a job. Otherwise the only possibilities are 
restaurants and cleaning. In UK, you can do more jobs without a diploma. 
In France a three or five star hotel needs a diploma. I was there many 
years: I just got up to salad -- I graduated from washing to cleaning to 
salads’. He and his wife also thought that there were many more 
opportunities for women to work in the UK, such as domestic work and 
cashier jobs in supermarkets or shops. 
A young Muslim Tamil who had spent his teenage years in the 
Netherlands after his family fled from their home in Jaffna during the 
LTTE’s expulsion of Muslims in 1990 had quickly found work in the UK. 
There were no jobs in the Netherlands, he said: he went to the UK 
because job prospects were better, and chose to settle in East Ham 
because he knew some friends there who said he could get work. ‘Some 
friends in England told me that it was better than the Netherlands: you 
could get better work there’. He worked in car repair in the Netherlands, 
and now worked in an exhaust and tyre fitting shop in East Ham.    
A Tamil who had settled in Germany in the early wave of refugees 
who left Sri Lankan around 1983 and had moved to the UK in 2005 found 
work easily as a fruit packer through an employment agency that 
recruited Tamils, Somalis and others for a food processing plant in Essex. 
He earned around the minimum wage, had applied for tax credit, and 
eventually wanted to set up his own restaurant, having worked in that 
sector in Germany. The three cases appear to show a fairly typical recent 
arrival employment pattern – accepting low paid work initially, while 
maintaining the aspiration to something better, particularly setting up a 
business.  
Education and language were also important factors. The aspiration 
to learn English and in particular for children to be educated in English 
was another key motivation for moving to the UK.  In addition to better 
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job prospects, the family from France referred to above moved to the UK 
because the husband wanted the children to learn English.  ‘Language is 
the main reason…English is the priority language in Sri Lanka’. Part of the 
motivation here was the prospect of return home to Sri Lanka (a forlorn 
hope since the disintegration of the ceasefire from late 2005). They said 
that if everything was settled in Sri Lanka, they wanted to go back, and 
that the children needed to know English for this. While the mother in this 
family was rather more ambivalent than her husband about moving to and 
staying in the UK, she accepted this argument. In the case of the Tamil 
family that had moved from Germany, problems with discipline at school 
and declining school results of the eldest son were part of the motivation 
for the move of the family to the UK. The desire for children to be 
educated in English and for them to experience less isolation at school 
appeared to be key motivations for movement to the UK. 
Finally, the social and cultural environment also played an 
important role in prompting relocation. Movement to the UK is in large 
part a reflection of regrouping at the level of the household and family. 
Some individuals and families that have moved to the UK have been 
pioneers, with the expectation that others would follow them.  Others 
have re-joined relatives earlier settled in the UK, having been separated in 
the course of displacement and the process of asylum-seeking.  Arguably, 
such re-grouping might have taken place whatever the location, once the 
opportunity arose.  A further important socio-cultural factor encouraging 
movement specifically to the UK is the greater critical mass of the Tamil 
population, which sustains temples, Tamil language classes, Saturday 
schools, and meets other cultural needs.  The contrast with life in 
continental Europe in this respect is often articulated.  For example, the 
Tamil family formerly living in Germany felt isolated there: ‘We were in 
Germany alone’. The parents were concerned about racism, particularly its 
effect on their children. The UK was more attractive because ‘we have 
more relations and more culture here’. In Germany, Tamils were more 
spread out than in the UK – so there was less of a critical mass of people 
that could support cultural activities. Further attractions were the greater 
presence of Tamil-run advice and welfare organisations in the UK. The 
family had heard about one such organisation and the possibility of a job 
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through it while in Germany. Having temples nearby was another factor. 
In general, ‘there are more opportunities for social activities here [in the 
UK]’.  Similarly, the young Dutch Tamil remarked simply: ‘there are more 
Tamils and less racism in London’. 
  While these dimensions – employment and livelihoods, education 
and language, and social and cultural environment -- are strong pull 
factors motivating movement from continental Europe to the UK, it would 
be misleading to present this ‘pull’ as universal and even. As has already 
come across in some of the above accounts, feelings about moving vary 
even within households. Spouses often differed in their opinions of the 
shift, and children likewise missed their friends in the previous country of 
settlement. Expectations of life in the UK were also sometimes not 
fulfilled. Thus the wife in the Tamil family that had moved to the UK from 
France found it lonely in the UK: Crawley where they lived was a very 
quiet area. She noted glumly that other relatives had lived a long time in 
France and were surrounded by relatives. She did not have many friends 
in the UK, only some cousins. She had ‘second thoughts’ and would have 
liked to go back to France, but her husband wanted them to stay.  More 
generally and tellingly, connections with friends and relatives in the 
former country of residence (France, Germany and the Netherlands in the 
cases cited above) were maintained assiduously – perhaps to maintain the 
possibility of return should things not work out in the UK, though this can 
also be seen as part of a wider pattern of maintaining connections across 
the diaspora.  
On the other hand, the move sometimes reflected a new-found 
confidence, coming at least in part from having secure status in the EU. 
As the Tamil family previously living in France noted: ‘Now we have more 
confidence. We have gone through a major uprooting once [the 
displacement in Sri Lanka and the move to Europe], so moving to UK was 
much easier. You don’t have to register here, just come with passport. To 
get into school, you just go to school admissions, with a French ID card.  
Now we are able to make a choice where to be’. 
The move to the UK does not seem to mark a break in the 
maintenance of transnational connections – both with others in the 
diaspora (in the former country of residence and elsewhere) and those 
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still in Sri Lanka.  The German Tamil referred to above had paid for the 
marriages of four sisters through his work in Germany and was now 
looking to do the same for cousins and nieces.  Like many others, he had 
also helped those remaining in Sri Lanka and with the wider Tamil cause 
through contributions to Tamil organisations in Sri Lanka.  
Are these relocations part of a long term strategy or are they a 
pragmatic response to new opportunities? There is not enough evidence to 
assess this.  One notable feature of the cases investigated so far is the 
short period of time between securing a passport allowing mobility within 
the EU, and the actual move to the UK.  This suggests perhaps that the 
idea of such a move is already well established. But the decision could 
also well be simply shaped by the apparent current general attractiveness 
of the UK to migrants generally. The most that can be said from current 
evidence is that among some Tamils living in continental Europe there is a 
strong impetus to move to the UK because of greater perceived economic 
opportunities, for reasons of education and language, to re-group with 
family and friends, and because of the greater critical mass of Tamils in 
parts of the UK and therefore the greater possibility to lead a familiar life. 
 
Towards a research agenda: key issues 
This preliminary review does not allow us to provide a 
comprehensive profile and explanation of this onward movement, but it 
does raise some key issues and questions that might form the basis for 
future research.  
First, we would need to know more about the migration patterns 
involved. What is the geography, demography, socio-economic profile, 
temporality and scale of the onward movement of new citizens of refugee 
backgrounds? For example, are the people moving onwards those who are 
less or more socio-economically established in their country of citizenship? 
Do people settle permanently or do they subsequently return to their 
earlier country of residence or country of origin? Do whole families 
relocate at once or do some family members remain in the country of 
citizenship while others find employment?  
Why do people move in this way? Mainstream migration theories 
may offer relevant explanations to consider. Neoclassical explanations 
 18 
conceptualise migration as part of the spatial redistribution of factors of 
production, reflecting individual responses to income and other 
differentials between home and host countries (e.g. Todaro 1969). The 
‘new economics of labour migration’ focuses on migration as a household-
level strategy to diversify income sources to minimise risks (e.g. Stark 
and Bloom 1985). Other theories emphasises the structure and demand 
from host countries as an explanatory factor (e.g. Piore 1979). Further 
theoretical approaches have incorporated social networks and institutions 
as factors in migration (e.g. Boyd 1989). Any investigation of EU mobility 
of new citizens will have to explore the possible roles of income and 
employment patterns; family economic strategies; social networks and 
institutions and other structural differences between EU countries.  
In this paper we have described the movement of new citizens 
within the EU as onward movement, rather than secondary movement. 
This is for two main reasons. First, the term secondary movement is 
simply not accurate for many of the people involved. It implies that the 
first movement was from the country of origin to Europe, and the second 
movement was within Europe. Many refugees’ migration history is more 
complicated, with some people living for a period in other countries before 
moving to Europe. For some people this is not a second but a third or 
even fourth stage in their migration. 
Second, the term secondary movement is most often used in recent 
years to describe movement of a distinct geographic type. The term is 
heavily associated with movement from poor first countries of asylum to 
richer countries. But the type of movement we are addressing is between 
richer countries. The much-scrutinised onward movement from countries 
of first asylum to Europe or North America is often explained by insecure 
politico-legal status and the very large economic disparities. We must 
reach for other explanations for the remigration of new citizens within the 
EU. 
Third, the term secondary movement has acquired a negative 
connotation in policy circles. Given the legal barriers enshrined in the ‘safe 
third country’ rule and at the EU level, the Dublin Convention, and visa 
restrictions imposed on refugee nationalities, to enter Europe and claim 
asylum without using irregular means at some point is very difficult for 
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people fleeing conflict-affected countries. The term secondary movement 
is strongly associated with irregular methods of entry used by displaced 
people in the region of origin to travel to Europe, and by undocumented 
newcomers, asylum-seekers or rejected asylum-seekers to travel onwards 
within the EU under the radar of the immigration control. Thus ‘irregular 
secondary movers’ has taken hold as a rather pejorative term (Sperl 
2001). This is in itself problematic, given the reasonable motivations of 
many of the people involved, but for our purposes the key point here is 
the distinction between onward movement involving irregular means and 
the regular free movement of new EU citizens of refugee backgrounds 
(see also Moret et al. 2005). 
These three points - that this can be another movement in a 
complex mobility chain, that the movement is between rich European 
countries, and that the mobility of citizens within the EU is entirely regular 
– need emphasising, because they raise important conceptual issues. 
One of the reasons this movement initially surprised some 
observers is because it appears to complicate the common notion of a 
‘refugee cycle’: with displacement followed either by wholesale settlement 
in a new country or eventual return to the country of origin. It is 
commonly expected that once refugees gain legal recognition and 
citizenship in the EU their journey is at an end, or that if they do move 
again, it will be to return to their country of origin. However, return is not 
an option for many: in 2004 there were 33 protracted refugee situations 
around the world (UNHCR 2006). Protracted violence and insecurity in 
both the Somali regions and Sri Lanka, for example, makes it very difficult 
for many people to return. 
Instead, much emphasis is placed on the process of settlement and 
socio-economic integration of those who have become citizens in EU 
countries. These processes of settlement and integration are largely seen 
to occur at a national level – refugees are expected to settle in France, or 
in Finland, for example, rather than in the EU. As refugees are commonly 
seen as traumatised by a dramatic ‘uprooting’, so it is often expected that 
if they cannot return then the best thing is to be ‘transplanted’ and ‘put 
down roots’ themselves in a new country (Malkii 1992). Thus, onward 
movement within the EU in a sense runs counter to expectations in the 
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refugee literature. Yet, the preliminary evidence suggests that some 
refugees have, in the course of displacement and onward migration, 
developed a ‘culture of mobility’ and may be more willing and able than 
other EU citizens to relocate within the EU. 
The onward movement of new citizens of refugee backgrounds is 
open to a variety of interpretations. For example, do people view their 
onward movement as a rejection of the country of asylum and an 
embracing of a second – they hope better – European home? Or do they 
feel that they are searching for an enclave, seeking to reconstruct aspects 
of their country of origin overseas wherever they believe will be most 
accommodating of that? What is the role in all this of national-level 
immigration and refugee policies, and policies directly aimed at the socio-
economic integration of asylum-seekers, refugees and new citizens? 
Does this relocation represent a return to older geographies of 
asylum? It has generally been common for people to seek asylum in 
European countries that were the largest and richest, and where their 
country of origin had historical ties – through colonisation, language or 
earlier labour migration – for example, Germany, France and the UK. 
However, during the 1990s, as asylum restrictions grew, new geographies 
of asylum developed such that many countries, including the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Spain and Italy, received growing numbers of claims from people 
with no obvious ties in those countries (Bocker and Havinga 1998). In her 
study with smuggled asylum-seekers in the Netherlands, Van Liempt 
(2007) outlines how in the urgency of seeking safety, and given 
considerable constraints on claiming asylum in the EU, asylum seekers 
may have no opportunity to decide on a specific destination, or there may 
be mismatches between their preferences and outcomes. The Dublin 
Convention tries to ensure that asylum claims are dealt with in the first 
country in which the claimant arrives in Europe, if not in a safe third 
country. But is it possible that as refugees become citizens and gain 
freedom to exercise more choice in where they live, they act according to 
earlier preferences? For example, do people from Francophone Africa who 
have become citizens elsewhere in the EU eventually relocate to France or 
Belgium? If so, to what extent this was an earlier intention or a plan that 
emerged at a later stage? 
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Alternatively, do these onward movers see themselves as 
embracing a regional (European) cosmopolitanism? Is it possible to think 
of their movement as demonstrating integration within the EU, rather than 
in specific countries? (Horst 2006b). Perhaps the willingness to move can 
be seen as evidence of a practical cosmopolitanism, indicating an 
everyday familiarity with different European cultures as well as that of 
their country of birth, and/or a deeper cosmopolitan consciousness or 
world view (Haupt 2007; Vertovec and Cohen 2002). In a legal sense, EU 
citizenship derives from and complements national citizenship, but the 
rights of EU citizens only apply when they are outside the Member State 
of their underlying citizenship, making movement central to the notion of 
EU citizenship (Guild 2004). How much do new citizens of refugee 
backgrounds differ from other EU citizens in terms of mobility? Could 
these new citizens moving onwards within the EU be seen in some ways 
as model Europeans?  The aim of this paper is to open up discussion of 
these and other questions and to prompt further investigation into a new 
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Leaving Denmark  
According to community workers, around 1,000 Somalis left 
Aarhus for the UK in 2001-2005 
Jyllandposten 17th 
March 2005 
Somali social advisor in Aarhus estimated that 3,000-4,000 
Somalis with Danish citizenship have moved to the UK from 
Aarhus in 2002-2004 
Bang Nielson 2004 
Leaving the Netherlands  
Dutch government representatives estimate 10,000 to 
20,000 Somali Dutch people have moved onwards to the UK 
Moret and Van Eck 
2005 
In 1998-2003, an estimated 10,000 Dutch Somalis moved to 
the UK (one third of all Dutch Somalis) 
Van den Reek and 
Hussein 2003, 
cited in Van Liempt 
2007 
An estimated 20,000 Dutch Somalis have left Holland for 
Britain over the past five years  
Evans-Pritchard 
2004 




Arriving in the UK  
In nine months in 2001-02 over 200 Somali Dutch families 
arrived in Birmingham, costing the council around £2.6 
million in 2000-2001, and an expected £1.8 million in 2001-
2002. 
 
Aston 2002; Marsh 
2002 
Since 1998 around 18,000 to 22,000 Somalis (mostly Dutch 
citizens) have moved to the UK from Western Europe and 
Scandinavia 
Momatrade 2004 
8,000 to 10,000 Somali Dutch nationals live in Leicester. The 
nine schools in the Highfields district are all at least one 
quarter Somali. 
White 2004 
According to a source at Leicester City Council, in May 2001, 
approximately 20-30 Somali EU nationals were arriving in 
Leicester per week, although this subsequently decreased 
Bang Nielson 2004 
Around 9000 Dutch school children of Somali parents arrived 




Debates for 30th 
Jan 2002 pt26 
In 2001-2004, an estimated 10,000 Somali Dutch citizens 
moved Leicester.  
UK Parliament, 
Select Committee 







Leicester government estimates their Somali inhabitants 
officially at 6,000, but it may be even 10,000, of which 90% 
are supposed to be Dutch. A British local government official 
estimated that in total 17,000 Somali Dutch nationals moved 
to the UK in 1998-2002 
Delhaas, 2002 




                                                 
i Based on information from EU 15. 
ii I.e. resident less than five years in another EU-15 Member State. 
iii See following sections. 
iv See following sections. 
v Moorehead (2006); also Dr Stephanie Riak Akuei personal correspondence with 
Anna Lindley, 2nd August 2007. 
vi Dr Ilse Van Liempt personal correspondence with Anna Lindley, 16th March 
2007. 
vii Rutter et al. (2007); Dr. Jill Rutter personal communication with Anna Lindley 
9th September 2007. 
viii Also nationals of the European Economic Area (EEA) which includes all EU 
member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
ix Note that there are still restrictions imposed on the A8 and Bulgarian and 
Romanian citizens in many Member States, but this is seen as an interim period. 
For the UK-specific information 
www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/applying/eeaeunationals. 
x See www.dwp.gov.uk/lifeevent/benefits. Under bilateral social security 
agreements, access to benefits in the UK may also depend on earlier 
contributions made by the individual in their previous EEA countries of residence 
(EC 2005). 
xi Sources: www.qca.org.uk/9993.html; 
www.dh.gov.uk/en/Policyandguidance/International/OverseasVisitors/Browsable/
DH_4971516  
xii www.qca.org.uk/qca_7533.aspx  
xiii Dutch asylum arrangements have since changed, but many of those who have 
come to the UK experienced this earlier system. 
xiv The commentaries of those involved do often make reference to nomadic 
culture (Horst 2006a; Lindley 2006; Warfa et al. 2005). But research explaining 
the geographic mobility of Somali refugees within the UK has stressed similarly 
concrete factors (Warfa et al. 2005). 
xv Pérouse de Montclos (2003) focuses on specific cases of transnational benefit 
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